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I. INTRODUCTION
Like most states, Pennsylvania levies a variety of fees and taxes
on users of its highways.2 These exactions are designed to partially
reimburse the state for the expense of maintaining and building
1. See 2 State Tax Guide (CCH) 50 (April 23, 1987) (summarizing highway user fee
schemes of each state).
2. See generally 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 261 la-261 lz (Tax on Liquid Fuels),
2614.1-.24 (Fuel Use Tax), 2617.1-.26 (Motor Carriers Road Tax) (Purdon 1964 & Supp.
1986); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1301-1377 (Registration Requirements), 1901-1960
(Registration Fees), 2101-2105 (Identification Markers for Motor Carriers Road Tax), 9501-
9512 (Taxes for Highway Maintenance and Construction), 9901-9910 (Axle Tax for Highway
Bridge Improvement) (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1986). Highway user fees are classified into three
groups: "first structure" taxes, which include registration and license fees; "second structure"
taxes, which include motor fuel taxes; and "third structure" taxes, which include any other
kind of tax (e.g., Pennsylvania's axle tax). See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY
ADMIN., ROAD USER AND PROPERTY TAXES ON SELECTED MOTOR VEHICLES, 1982, at 7
(1982); C. TAFF, COMMERCIAL MOTOR TRANSPORTATION 48 (7th ed. 1986); Note, Taxation
of Interstate Motor Commerce-Federal Occupation of the Field?, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 71, 79
(1951).
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its roads and bridges.3 In an effort to raise more revenue for bridge
rehabilitation and replacement, 4 in 1983 Pennsylvania levied a tax of
$36 per axle on trucks using the state's highways that weigh over
26,000 pounds.5 Because Pennsylvania simultaneously reduced regis-
tration fees on in-state trucks, the axle tax in actual operation bur-
dened only those trucks registered outside Pennsylvania.6
Other states soon responded. Within three months, the legisla-
ture of neighboring New Jersey denounced the axle tax for "causing
great hardship" to owners of trucks registered in New Jersey and
other states, and called on all states to take "retaliatory measures"
against Pennsylvania.7 A year later Maine retaliated by adopting
what it called "reciprocal taxes."' These taxes were designed to mir-
ror the taxes that other states (e.g., Pennsylvania) imposed on Maine-
registered vehicles. 9 These events illustrate an important question
currently facing the Supreme Court in American Trucking Associa-
tions v. Scheiner:10 To what extent and in what manner may a state
tax motor carriers engaged in interstate commerce to finance the facil-
ities that the state provides to these carriers without violating the
commerce clause?
This Note discusses whether Pennsylvania's axle tax is constitu-
tional under the commerce clause. The first section considers whether
the axle tax discriminates against interstate commerce. The next sec-
tion discusses whether the complementary tax doctrine saves the dis-
criminatory axle tax from invalidation. The section first addresses the
argument that the axle tax may not be defended under the comple-
3. The Pennsylvania Constitution requires that the proceeds of all highway user fees be
used for "construction, reconstruction, maintenance and repair of and safety on public
highways bridges and costs and expenses incident thereto." PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 11.
4. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 510 Pa. 430, 439, 509 A.2d 838, 843 (citing 75
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9907(a), 9908 (Purdon Supp. 1986)), prob. juris noted, 107 S. Ct.
430 (1986).
5. Act of Dec. 8, 1982, No. 234, § 3, 1982 Pa. Laws 842, 845 (codified at 75 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9901-9910 (Purdon Supp. 1986)).
6. For a discussion of why the axle tax burden is imposed almost entirely upon interstate
commerce, see infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
7. S.J. Res. 8019, 200th Leg., 2d Sess., 1983 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 1478 (West), reproduced
in Brief for Appellants at la-2a, Scheiner (No. 86-357).
8. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 2243-C (Supp. 1986).
9. Id. Thus, Maine would levy a tax of $36 per axle on trucks registered in Pennsylvania
weighing over 26,000 pounds. See Private Truck Council of Am., Inc. v. Secretary of State,
503 A.2d 214, 216 (Me.) (holding "reciprocal truck taxes" in violation of the commerce
clause), cert, denied, 106 S. Ct. 1997 (1986); see also Private Truck Council of Am., Inc. v.
New Hampshire, 128 N.H. 466, -., 517 A.2d 1150, 1154 (1986) (imposing a retaliatory tax "is
not a legitimate means by which to alleviate another state's alleged burden on interstate
commerce").
10. 510 Pa. 430, 509 A.2d 838, prob. juris noted, 107 S. Ct. 430 (1986).
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mentary tax doctrine because Pennsylvania-based trucks do not suffer
under any tax burden which needs to be compensated. This section
then considers whether the axle tax and the registration fees fulfill the
requirement that both levies be imposed upon substantially equivalent
activity. The third section of this Note explores whether the cases
that upheld flat-rate highway user fees against commerce clause chal-
lenges are still good law. The final section concludes that flat-rate
highway user fees should be assessed under a new analysis.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
American Trucking Associations (ATA) brought a class action
on behalf of all interstate motor carriers whose vehicles are registered
outside of Pennsylvania and who are, or will be, subject to section
9902 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, the axle tax.1" ATA sought
to have the axle tax declared unconstitutional on the ground that it
discriminated against interstate commerce.' The Pennsylvania trial
court found that, because of simultaneous registration fee reductions,
the axle tax, as a practical matter, fell almost entirely on trucks regis-
tered out of state. 3 Accordingly, it held that the tax discriminated
against interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause.
1 4
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding that
the axle tax, although burdening interstate commerce only, did not
discriminate against interstate commerce because it compensated for
the registration fees imposed only on local commerce, and that the tax
11. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9902 (Purdon Supp. 1986). ATA also brought another
suit challenging the constitutionality of section 2102(b) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, the
marker identification fee. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2102(b) (Purdon Supp. 1986). The
Pennsylvania trial court struck down the $25 marker fee as violating the commerce clause
because it was imposed only on trucks based outside Pennsylvania. American Trucking Ass'ns
v. Bloom, 77 Pa. Commw. 575, 466 A.2d 755 (1983), aff'd, 87 Pa. Commw. 345, 487 A.2d 768
(1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 510 Pa. 430, 509 A.2d
838, prob. juris noted, 107 S. Ct. 430 (1986). The appeal was consolidated with the axle tax
appeal and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed. Scheiner, 510 Pa. at 451-59, 509
A.2d at 849-53. ATA subsequently appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the United
States. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. at 430. Because the marker fee and the axle tax raise the same
issue (i.e., whether a flat tax disproportionately burdens interstate commerce), the marker
identification fee will not be discussed in this Note.
12. Scheiner, 510 Pa. at 444, 509 A.2d at 845-46. ATA also challenged the axle tax under
the privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, and the equal protection clause,
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 510 Pa. at 444, 509 A.2d at 846. The supreme court rejected these
claims. Id. at 463-64, 509 A.2d at 855-56. ATA is not raising these claims on appeal. See
Brief for Appellants, Scheiner (No. 86-357).
13. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Bloom, 87 Pa. Commw. 379, 382, 487 A.2d 465, 467
(1985), rev'd sub nor. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 510 Pa. 430, 509 A.2d 838,
prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 430 (1986).
14. Id.
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was fairly related to the services provided to interstate commerce.' 5
The Supreme Court of the United States has noted probable jurisdic-
tion over this case.16
Pennsylvania enacted the axle tax in December 1982."7 The tax
applies to any truck or combination operated on Pennsylvania's high-
ways that weighs more than 26,000 pounds."8 It requires an annual
payment of $36 per axle. 19 Because trucks and combinations subject
to the tax have between two and five axles, they pay an annual tax of
between $72 and $180.20 The stated purpose of the axle tax is "to
provide for the creation of jobs and the rehiring of the unemployed in
this Commonwealth" through projects funded by the Pennsylvania
Highway Bridge Improvement Restricted Account within the Motor
License Fund.2' These projects involve the "rehabilitation, replace-
ment and removal" of bridges on state highways.22
The legislation that created the axle tax simultaneously reduced
the annual registration fees of those Pennsylvania trucks and truck
tractors subject to the new axle tax.23 This reduction was in multiples
of $36 and in almost every instance offset the entire effect of the axle
tax.24 As explained by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, "[t]he
incremental $36 registration fee reductions roughly correspond to the
number of axles legally required for vehicles of various weights."25
15. Scheiner, 510 Pa. at 463-64, 509 A.2d at 855.
16. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 430 (1986) (noting probable
jurisdiction).
17. Act of Dec. 8, 1982, No. 234, § 3, 1982 Pa. Laws 842, 845 (codified at 75 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9901-9910 (Purdon Supp. 1986)). The axle tax took effect April 1, 1983. Id. at
847.
18. Section 9902 provides as follows:
In addition to any other tax imposed by law, all motor carriers shall pay an
annual tax in the amount of $36 per axle on every truck, truck tractor or
combination having a gross weight or registered gross weight in excess of 26,000
pounds operated on the highways of this Commonwealth.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9902 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
19. Id. Vehicles traveling less than 2000 miles per year in Pennsylvania are entitled to a
rebate of the axle tax in proportion to their reduced mileage. Id. § 9905.
20. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4941 (Purdon Supp. 1986); see also Brief for
Appellants at 4, Scheiner (No. 86-357). "Before rebates, the axle tax raised approximately $80
million in fiscal year 1983-84, of which about $68 million was paid for trucks registered in
states other than Pennsylvania." Id.
21. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9907(b) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
22. Id. § 9908.
23. Act of Dec. 8, 1982, No. 234, § 1, 1982 Pa. Laws 842 (codified at 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 9916(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986)).
24. This offsetting effect is best seen by comparing Act of Dec. 8, 1982, No. 234, § 1, 1982
Pa. Laws 842, 842-43, which sets out the pre- and post-amendment registration fees, with 75
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4941 (Purdon Supp. 1986), which establishes the maximum weights
of trucks and combinations.
25. Scheiner, 510 Pa. at 439, 509 A.2d at 843 (quoting American Trucking Ass'ns v.
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Thus, the reductions in Pennsylvania's registration fees nullify the
effect of the axle tax on in-state registered vehicles.
III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
The commerce clause states that "Congress shall have Power...
[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States."26  Although the commerce clause is phrased as a grant of
power to Congress, it has long been interpreted to be a self-executing
limitation on the states' taxing power.2" This is because the " 'basic
purpose of the Clause' [is] to prohibit the multiplication of preferen-
tial trade areas destructive of the free commerce anticipated by the
Constitution. ' 2  Thus, the commerce clause "by its own force cre-
ate[s] an area of trade free from interference by the States."29
The commerce clause's limitation on a state's power to tax is of
course not absolute. A state tax is not per se invalid merely because it
burdens interstate commerce.30 Rather, as the Supreme Court has
stated repeatedly, "interstate commerce may be made to pay its way,"
(i.e., for its share of the state's expenses for the services and facilities
provided to it).3 The Court's role is to strike a "delicate balanc[e]"
between the state's interest "in exercising its taxing powers" and the
"national interest in free and open trade. '3 2
To effect this balance, the Court has developed an antidis-
crimination principle.33 This "cardinal rule" of commerce clause
jurisprudence holds that no state, "consistent with the Commerce
Clause, may 'impose a tax which discriminates against interstate com-
merce ... by providing a direct commercial advantage to local busi-
Bloom, 87 Pa. Commw. 379, 382, 487 A.2d 465, 467 (1985), rev'd sub nom. American
Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 510 Pa. 430, 509 A.2d 838, prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 430
(1986)).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
27. See, e.g., Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 328-29 (1977);
Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
28. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 754 (1981) (quoting Boston Stock Exch., 429
U.S. at 356).
29. Freeman, 329 U.S. at 252.
30. Maryland, 451 U.S. at 754; Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
31. E.g., Maryland, 451 U.S. at 754; Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 281; Evansville-
Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707, 714 (1972).
32. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 403 (1984); Boston Stock Exch. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977).
33. This principle embodies one of the prongs in the four-prong test that the Court
established in Complete Auto to determine when a state tax upon interstate commerce should
be upheld. The tax will be sustained if it: (1) has a substantial nexus with the state; (2) is fairly
apportioned; (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) is fairly related to
the services provided by the state. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 277-78.
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ness.' ",34 In applying the antidiscrimination principle, the proper
focus is on the practical impact of the tax on interstate commerce.3 5
The tax's impact can be accurately assessed only when the levy is
viewed "in conjunction with other provisions of the State's tax
scheme."' 36 Thus, a tax that apparently discriminates against inter-
state commerce may be saved from invalidation if another levy
imposes a comparable burden upon local commerce.37 In such a situ-
ation, the overall tax burden would be nondiscriminatory.
A state is barred not only from levying a tax that discriminates
against interstate commerce but also from imposing a tax that dispro-
portionately burdens interstate commerce. To survive a dispropor-
tionate burden challenge, the tax must bear a reasonable relationship
to the presence or activities of interstate commerce in the taxing
state. a
A. The Axle Tax Discriminates in Effect
The axle tax, if viewed in isolation, does not discriminate against
interstate commerce. By its terms, the tax applies to "all motor carri-
ers" weighing over 26,000 pounds that use Pennsylvania's highways.3 9
When the axle impost and the simultaneous reduction in registration
fees are considered together, however, the impact of the new tax dis-
34. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 268 (1984) (quoting Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959)).
35. Maryland, 451 U.S. at 756. This contrasts with the formalistic approach used before
Complete Auto. The formalistic approach focused on whether the tax was imposed directly or
indirectly upon interstate commerce. A tax imposed directly was per se invalid. Compare
Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (holding unconstitutional tax on
"privilege" of doing business when applied against exclusively interstate business) with
Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (upholding tax on "privilege" of doing
business when applied against exclusively interstate business). See generally P. HARTMAN,
FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 2:13-:19 (1981) (tracing history
of Court's analysis of state taxes on interstate commerce).
36. Maryland, 451 U.S. at 756.
37. This is called the complementary (or compensating) tax doctrine. See Henneford v.
Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 585 (1937) (state's taxing scheme held nondiscriminatory
because its 2% use tax compensates for its 2% sales tax); see also Hellerstein, Complementary
Taxes as a Defense to Unconstitutional State Tax Discrimination, 39 TAX LAW. 405, 406
(1986) ("A tax that singles out interstate commerce for discriminatory treatment is upheld in
light of a 'substantially equivalent levy' imposing a comparable burden on local commerce.");
Note, A Call for Internal Consistency Among State Taxing Schemes: Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty,
38 TAX LAW. 519, 520 n.17 (1985) ("A 'compensating tax' is one that compensates for a like
burden on in-state business and results in nondiscriminatory treatment of in-state and out-of-
state transactions.").
38. See infra Section III (C).
39. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9902 (Purdon Supp. 1986). A "motor carrier" is defined
as "[e]very person who operates or causes to be operated any motor vehicle on any highway in
this Commonwealth." Id. § 9901.
1122
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criminates against interstate commerce. 4°
ATA, in its brief to the Supreme Court, raised the discrimina-
tion-in-effect argument as follows: First, ATA contended that if the
axle tax were imposed solely on interstate commerce, a court would
strike it down as a facially discriminatory tax.41 ATA then posited
that the axle tax must be struck down if it effects the same result
through "manipulation. ' 42  The simultaneous reduction of Penn-
sylvania registration fees on vehicles subject to the axle tax in
amounts virtually identical to the new impost constitutes such
"manipulation." 43
ATA's argument is compelling. 44 Admittedly, the fact that the
reduction in Pennsylvania's registration fees was simultaneous to the
imposition of the axle tax is not the dispositive factor. Although this
fact may raise an inference of discriminatory intent,45 it is unlikely to
overcome the traditional deference that the Court gives to legislative
acts.46 Rather, the disposing fact is that the registration fee reductions
offset virtually the entire effect of the axle tax on vehicles based in-
state. This renders the axle tax discriminatory in practical effect
regardless of the legislature's actual intent.
The Court has invalidated facially neutral taxes when exemp-
tions or credits favoring local commerce existed in other parts of the
40. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
41. Brief for Appellants at 17, Scheiner (No. 86-357).
42. Id. at 5, 18; see also Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455 (1940) ("The commerce
clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious.").
43. Brief for Appellants at 19-20.
44. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania admitted that "[a]t first blush, this is an appealing
argument" but concluded that the axle tax was valid under the compensating tax doctrine.
Scheiner, 510 Pa. at 459, 509 A.2d at 853.
45. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984) (excise tax on liquor sales
discriminated against interstate commerce because undisputed purpose of tax exemption was
to aid local industry).
46. See Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707, 716-
17 (1972) (state legislature need not base a user fee on the most "exact[ ]" formula);
McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 183 (1940) (Black, J., dissenting) (any
reasonable doubt as to the constitutional validity of a state's legislation must be resolved in its
favor); cf. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (despite noting that
legislative history of New York's amended transfer tax indicated discriminatory intent, Court's
analysis of tax's validity focused solely on its practical effect). But see Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 639 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The legislative history
of [Montana's severance tax] is illuminating."). See generally Tatarowicz & Mims-Velarde, An
Analytical Approach to State Tax Discrimination Under the Commerce Clause, 39 VAND. L.
REV. 879, 903-05 (1986) (effect of legislative history on Court's analysis of a state tax's
validity).
47. Indeed, ATA's discriminatory intent argument rests on Pennsylvania's concession that
in adopting these offsetting reductions the state "intended to lessen the burden upon 'local
commerce.'" See Brief for Appellants at 18 (quoting Scheiner, 510 Pa. at 459, 509 A.2d at
853).
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state's code. In Maryland v. Louisiana,48 Louisiana imposed a "first
use" tax on natural gas. "The Act itself, as well as provisions found
elsewhere in the state statutes, provided a number of exemptions from
and credits for the First-Use Tax."49 These provisions "substantially
protected [the Louisiana consumer] against the impact of the [tax]." 5
The Court therefore held that the first-use tax "unquestionably dis-
criminate[d] against interstate commerce in favor of local commerce
as the necessary result of various tax credits and exclusions."51
The axle tax actually effects its discrimination because of the
presence of tax reductions elsewhere in the state code (i.e., in the regis-
tration fees on Pennsylvania-based trucks). 2 There appears to be no
reason, however, why the Court would not apply the Maryland v.
Louisiana 53 holding to a tax that discriminates because of offsetting
tax reductions rather than because of exemptions or credits. In either
case, the entire tax burden is placed squarely on the shoulders of
interstate commerce. Moreover, any other holding would grant the
more creative state legislatures a privilege to discriminate against
interstate commerce through artful tax drafting.
B. The Complementary Tax Doctrine
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did not deny that the regis-
tration fee reductions tended to nullify the axle tax's effect on local
commerce." Instead, it upheld the axle tax under the complementary
tax doctrine." The court reasoned that the axle tax on foreign-based
vehicles was a complementary tax because it compensated for the
registration fees levied against Pennsylvania-based vehicles:
[C]onsidered in conjunction with all other provisions of Penn-
48. 451 U.S. 725 (1981); see Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (holding
excise tax on liquor wholesalers unconstitutional because of exemptions for local liquor
manufacturers); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984) (holding that New
York tax credit against Domestic International Sales Corporation accumulated income for
gross receipts attributable to export shipments made from New York discriminated against
interstate commerce).
49. Maryland, 451 U.S. at 732.
50. Id. at 757.
51. Id. at 756. The Court rejected Louisiana's argument that the first-use tax was a
compensatory tax for the state's severance tax on local production of natural gas because it
found that the two taxes were not imposed on "substantially equivalent event[s]." Id. at 759.
For a discussion of the Court's reasoning, see infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
53. 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
54. Scheiner, 510 Pa. at 459, 509 A.2d at 853. The court, in fact, admitted that the
"registration fee reduction almost exactly offsets the $36.00 axle tax." Id.
55. For a definition of the complementary tax doctrine, see supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
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sylvania's highway user fee system, [the axle tax] works no dis-
crimination against interstate commerce in practical operation. It
is entirely proper for a state to enact a compensatory tax to neu-
tralize or partially offset an economic advantage previously
enjoyed by interstate commerce to the disadvantage of local com-
merce that was caused by operation of that state's taxing system.
5 6
1. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE COMPLEMENTARY TAX: ONE-SIDED
TAX BURDEN
The justification for a compensating tax is that it offsets a tax
burden that is imposed solely upon local commerce. 7 A state will
impose the compensating tax upon interstate commerce to nullify this
one-sided burden. 8 This assumes that there is indeed a burden that
must be compensated.
a. Indirect Tax Contribution by Foreign-Based Trucks
ATA, in its brief to the Supreme Court, contended that there is
no one-sided tax burden on Pennsylvania-based trucks because for-
eign-based trucks have already indirectly contributed to Pennsylvania
56. Scheiner, 510 Pa. at 462, 509 A.2d at 855. In its brief to the Supreme Court,
Pennsylvania surprisingly refused to rely on the complementary tax doctrine and conceded
that the axle tax "has no specific counterpart imposed only on in-state businesses." Brief for
Appellees at 18-19, Scheiner (No. 86-357). Instead, Pennsylvania argued that under
Pennsylvania's entire scheme of highway user fees, Pennsylvania-based trucks pay higher taxes
for using the state's highways than do foreign-based trucks: "[The Axle Tax is but a small
part of Pennsylvania's multi-tiered scheme of taxes and fees designed to finance an extensive
highway system. Under that scheme, domestic trucks clearly pay a higher price for the use of
Pennsylvania highways than those registered out-of-state." Id. at 17, 18 n.17. Pennsylvania,
however, could point only to its registration fees as an example of a tax that Pennsylvania-
based trucks pay, but foreign-based trucks do not pay. See id. at 8-9. Given the existence of
Pennsylvania's reciprocity arrangements, Pennsylvania could not rely upon the rather
unsurprising fact that foreign-based trucks do not pay Pennsylvania's registration fees to prove
that Pennsylvania-based trucks "pay a higher price" for using the state's highways. See
Scheiner, 510 Pa. at 472, 509 A.2d at 860 (Nix, C.J. & McDermott, J., dissenting); see also
Brief for Appellants at 26-27 (Pennsylvania's tax redistribution argument "rests on
unsubstantiated assertions and post hoc rationalizations."). Yet, Pennsylvania could have
relied upon this fact to support a complementary tax argument. Despite Pennsylvania's
concession, the complementary tax doctrine will be discussed in this Note because it is the only
theory that can sustain a discriminatory tax under the commerce clause.
57. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 758 (1981) ("The concept of a compensatory
tax first requires identification of the burden for which the State is attempting to
compensate.").
58. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937) (purpose of compensatory use
tax is to help local retailers compete on terms of equality with out-of-state counterparts who
are exempt from sales tax and to avoid the likelihood of a drain upon the state's revenues
because buyers could avoid sales tax by placing orders out of state); see also Hellerstein, supra
note 37, at 406-07 (compensating use taxes prevent state from losing business and revenue).
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for their use of the state's highways.59 Pennsylvania therefore cannot
justify the axle tax under the complementary tax doctrine. ATA's
argument hinges on the presence of Pennsylvania's reciprocity provi-
sions.6° Pennsylvania, like almost every other state, engages in reci-
procity. 61 Reciprocity is an arrangement where State A will offer the
same registration fee exemptions to vehicles from State B that State B
offers to vehicles from State A .62 ATA argues that " 'reciprocity rep-
resents an indirect contribution by foreign-based trucks to the treas-
ury of the State of [Pennsylvania]; the agreement of their home states
not to tax [Pennsylvania]-based trucks leaves [Pennsylvania] free to
collect more than it otherwise could from its own truckers.' "63 In
other words, trucks based in, say, Ohio have contributed to Penn-
sylvania that amount of money which Ohio could have taxed Penn-
sylvania-based trucks but for the reciprocity arrangement.
This argument is not without difficulties. First, unless Penn-
sylvania actually receives this indirect economic contribution, the
one-sided tax burden on Pennsylvania-based trucks will still exist.
The mere theoretical possibility that a state may increase its registra-
tion fees does not eliminate an existing tax disadvantage.64 Thus,
until a state actually adjusts its registration fees, it should not be fore-
closed from justifying a discriminatory tax as a compensating tax.
More fundamentally, the amount of tax that the reciprocating
states indirectly contribute may be far less than the amount that they
receive. This will occur when the damage to State A's facilities caused
59. Brief for Appellants at 22-24. ATA has raised this argument in other cases and
prevailed. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 146 Vt. 574, 508 A.2d 405 (1986)
(discriminatory taxes are not compensatory because foreign-based trucks "have already
indirectly contributed to Vermont's treasury by virtue of this reciprocity"), petition for cert.
filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3032 (U.S. July 21, 1986) (No. 86-69); American Trucking Ass'ns v.
Conway, 146 Vt. 579, 508 A.2d 408 (1986) (same), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3153
(U.S. Aug. 22, 1986) (No. 86-276); American Trucking Ass'ns v. Quinn, 437 A.2d 623 (Me.
1981) (same); see also Private Truck Council of Am., Inc. v. New Hampshire, 128 N.H. 466,
517 A.2d 1150 (1986) (discriminatory permit fees do not compensate for registration fees).
60. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6141-6153 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1986) (statutory
provisions governing registration fee reciprocity).
61. See generally C. TAFF, supra note 2, at 48 ("The laws of 43 states currently provide
that written reciprocity agreements with other states are permissible."); Note, supra note 2, at
79-83 (structure of state highway user fee schemes).
62. See C. TAFF, supra note 2, at 48. See generally 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6141-
6153 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1986) (statutory provisions governing registration fee reciprocity).
63. Brief for Appellants at 23-24 (quoting Quinn, 437 A.2d at 626-27).
64. A state is unlikely to adjust its registration fees when they are already high. Cf. Note,
supra note 2, at 83 n.87 ("Another reason for the existence of third structure taxes is the inertia
of tax structures built around them."). For a discussion of the difference between first, second,
and third structure taxes, see supra note 2. Pennsylvania's registration fees on five-axle
tractor-semitrailer combinations (78,000 lbs. gross vehicle weight) are the tenth highest in the
nation. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 2, at 33.
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by trucks from State B (a reciprocating state) does not correspond to
the damage to State B's facilities caused by State A's trucks. For
example, a state with a relatively small number of trucks used in
interstate commerce and a large amount of interstate highways would
be under a substantial disadvantage.65 This is because the amount of
tax which other states have forgone would not reflect the degree of
road and bridge damage caused by their trucks. Thus, although the
state may be "free to collect" more tax from trucks based in the state,
that amount often would not reflect the damage to the state's facili-
ties. Pennsylvania, however, cannot easily claim to suffer under this
kind of disadvantage. It ranks seventh in the nation in total number
of registered trucks.66 Accordingly, it has likely received a sizable
indirect tax contribution from other states. Pennsylvania therefore
cannot easily contend that it must levy the axle tax to nullify a tax
imbalance.
b. Effect of Pennsylvania's Reciprocity Policy
Assuming that foreign-based trucks do not indirectly (or ade-
quately) contribute to Pennsylvania through the reciprocity arrange-
ment, the axle tax still may not be justified as a compensating tax.
According to this argument, Pennsylvania has voluntarily created the
supposed one-sided burden on Pennsylvania-based trucks by waiving
its right to impose registration fees on foreign-based trucks.67 Penn-
sylvania therefore cannot point to the existence of that burden to jus-
tify the imposition of a compensating tax.
How exactly does this waiver theory work? Pennsylvania, by
recognizing reciprocity, has already decided to exempt foreign-based
vehicles from its registration fees.6" Having made this decision, the
65. See Note, supra note 2, at 82 & n.79, 83 & n.87.
66. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., HIGHWAY STATISTICS, 1985,
at 19 (1985).
67. ATA did not explicitly raise this argument in its brief. See Brief for Appellants at 22-
27. It raised the argument and prevailed in other cases, however, where the same issue was
involved. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 146 Vt. 574, 508 A.2d 405 (1986) (by
enacting reciprocity statute, state waived right to impose new user fees on interstate
commerce), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3032 (U.S. July 21, 1986) (No. 86-69);
American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 146 Vt. 579, 508 A.2d 408 (1986) (same), petition for
cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3153 (U.S. Aug. 22, 1986) (No. 86-276); American Trucking Ass'ns v.
Quinn, 437 A.2d 623 (Me. 1981) (same); see also Private Truck Council of Am., Inc. v. New
Hampshire, 128 N.H. 466, -, 517 A.2d 1151, 1154 (1986) (New Hampshire's acceptance of
registration reciprocity "constituted a waiver of its right to impose registration fees on foreign-
registered vehicles."). This Note will therefore examine the argument.
68. Pennsylvania's automatic reciprocity statute, for example, provides as follows:
If no agreement, arrangement or declaration is in effect with respect to another
jurisdiction as authorized by this subchapter, any vehicle properly registered or
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state cannot turn around and claim that it now must tax foreign-based
vehicles to equalize the resulting one-sided tax burden. The very rea-
son for the burden's supposed one-sidedness is that the state had pre-
viously decided only to tax local commerce (by enacting the
reciprocity statute). Pennsylvania's reciprocity statute therefore
waives the state's right to subsequently adopt the axle tax as a com-
pensating tax.
The proposition that a state waives its sovereign power to tax
when it decides to adopt a policy of reciprocity, on first glance,
appears to be indefensible. No case advancing this remarkable theory
has cited to any supporting authority.69 It certainly cannot be said
that, by adopting a reciprocity policy, the state has relinquished its
taxing power in the manner traditionally associated with a waiver of a
constitutional right.7° On the contrary, a state ordinarily has every
right to amend and modify its tax structure.71
There is a premise, however, which can support the waiver argu-
ment. This unarticulated premise must be that the reciprocity statute
embodies a compact which the state cannot impair or alter.72 The
waiver argument therefore must ultimately be premised upon the
compact and contract clauses.73  Framed under these clauses, the
licensed in the other jurisdiction, and for which evidence of compliance is
supplied, shall receive, when operated in this Commonwealth, the same
exemptions, benefits and privileges granted by the other jurisdiction to vehicles
properly registered in this Commonwealth.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6149 (Purdon 1977).
69. See Conway, 146 Vt. at -, 508 A.2d at 407; Quinn, 437 A.2d at 626-27.
70. See Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 561 (1830) (Waiver of taxing
power "ought not to be presumed, in a case in which the deliberate purpose of the state to
abandon it does not appear."). As the Court has stated in a different context: "A waiver is
ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (waiver of sixth amendment right to counsel).
71. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 & n.13 (1977) ("[T]he
Contract Clause does not prohibit the States from repealing or amending statutes generally, or
from enacting legislation with retroactive effects."); cf Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,
428 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1976) ("[L]egislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic
life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and ... the burden is on one
complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary
and irrational way.").
72. Or, to be more precise, by imposing a third structure tax (the axle tax), Pennsylvania
has impaired its obligation under the reciprocity agreement not to impose first structure taxes
(registration fees) on vehicles based in the reciprocating state. A registration fee reciprocity
agreement would be worthless if a state could avoid it simply by imposing a tax of a different
type. For a discussion of the difference between first, second, and third structure taxes, see
supra note 2. This argument has not been articulated in the Brief for Appellants, nor in any
other case dealing with the complementary tax doctrine and reciprocity. No other theory,
however, can justify the premise that a state is barred from modifying or revoking its
statutorily-created reciprocity policy by imposing another user fee.
73. The compact clause states: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress... enter
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waiver argument essentially states that Pennsylvania has entered a
compact with other states so that no state will impose registration fees
on vehicles based in the other states. 74  By imposing the axle tax,
Pennsylvania has altered this compact in violation of the contract
clause. 75 Owners of foreign-based trucks, as third-party beneficiaries,
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The contract clause states: "No State shall... pass any... Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
74. In this case, a tax exemption compact between Pennsylvania and other states could
arise by virtue of two devices. See generally United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 468-71 (1978) (forms which agreements or compacts subject to
compact clause may take). First, Pennsylvania's Secretary of Transportation may execute
formal agreements with other states. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6142-6144 (Purdon 1977 &
Supp. 1986). Until September 1982, Pennsylvania had entered into bilateral Apportioned
Registration Agreements with 23 states and provinces. Scheiner, 510 Pa. at 436, 509 A.2d at
841. Thereafter, Pennsylvania became a member of the International Registration Plan (IRP).
Id. Under both of these agreement structures, "apportionable vehicles" (such as interstate
carriers) would pay Pennsylvania's registration fees in proportion to the fraction of miles
traveled in Pennsylvania to total miles. Id. For a discussion of the different forms of
reciprocity agreements, see C. TAFF, supra note 2, at 48-49.
The second way in which a tax exemption compact between Pennsylvania and other states
could arise is through reciprocal legislation. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6149 (Purdon 1977).
For the text of Pennsylvania's automatic reciprocity statute, see supra note 68. Pennsylvania's
automatic reciprocity statute plays a dual role in forming tax exemption contracts. It
constitutes an acceptance of other states' offers for reciprocity made by virtue of their own
automatic reciprocity statutes. It also manifests an offer of reciprocity to those states that have
not yet enacted similar automatic reciprocity statutes. See F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL,
THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 8-10 (1976); see also P. HARDY, INTERSTATE
COMPACTS: THE TIES THAT BIND 2-3 (1982) ("In the case of interstate compacts, both the
offer and the acceptance exist in the form of legislative acts.").
Congressional consent is not required for all interstate compacts despite the blanket
language of the compact clause. See Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. at 472 (upholding
Multistate Tax Compact which established the Multistate Tax Commission even though
compact did not receive congressional approval); Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583, 586 (1953)
(upholding reciprocal legislation agreement even though it did not receive congressional
approval). Consent is necessary only if the compact "enhance[s] the political power of the
member States in a way that encroaches upon the supremacy of the United States." Multistate
Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. at 473; accord Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 517-18 (1893).
Such is not the case here. Pennsylvania's reciprocity agreements are "purely fiscal interstate
agreements that facilitate interstate commerce and aid in execution of internal revenue policies
... [and] conduce to, rather than restrain, commerce among the several states." See Bode v.
Barrett, 412 Ill. 204, 233, 106 N.E.2d 521, 536 (1952), aff'd, 344 U.S. 583 (1953); see also
Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of
Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 712 (1976)
("Reciprocal tax statutes ... provide the paradigm instance of arrangements not deemed to
require the consent of Congress.").
75. Interstate compacts, like any other contract to which a state is a party, are protected
from impairment by the contract clause. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 91-93 (1823)
(holding that the compact between Virginia and Kentucky by which private land titles in
Kentucky, derived from Virginia before the separation of Kentucky from Virginia, "shall
remain valid and secure" under the laws of Kentucky, and shall be determined by the laws
"now existing" in Virginia, was impaired in violation of the contract clause by subsequent
Kentucky legislation that adversely affected these titles); cf West Virginia ex rel Dyer v. Sims,
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would have standing to enforce the compact.76
341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951) ("[A]n agreement solemnly entered into between States... can[not] be
unilaterally nullified"....). See generally V. THURSBY, INTERSTATE COOPERATION 38-40
(1953) (discussing the relationship of the compact clause to the contract clause); B. WRIGHT,
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 46-47 (1938) (discussing the application of
the contract clause to interstate compacts). In the instant case, Pennsylvania should be barred
from levying the axle tax on foreign-based trucks because this tax would impair the state's
obligations under the reciprocity compacts. The IRP compact would be impaired because,
unlike Pennsylvania's registration fees, the axle tax would not be apportioned on the basis of
in-state mileage. The reciprocal legislation compacts would also be impaired because these
compacts directly rule out such unilaterally imposed taxes.
The only question remaining is the extent to which the contract clause proscribes the
impairment of a state's obligation under an interstate compact. A state under certain
circumstances may impair the obligations of private contracts. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934) (upholding a state moratorium on mortgage
foreclosures); see also Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (striking
down a statute that impaired a private contract but applying a balancing test). A state may
also impair public contracts on appropriate occasions. See United States Trust Co. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977) ("As with laws impairing the obligations of private contracts, an
impairment [of a public contract] may be constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to
serve an important public purpose."). See generally Note, A Process-Oriented Approach to the
Contract Clause, 89 YALE L.J. 1623, 1647-49 (1980) (discussing the distinction between public
and private contracts). Biddle, the only case which has applied the contract clause to an
interstate compact, seemed to suggest that in this context the contract clause must be read
literally. See 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 84 ("The objection to a law, on the ground of its impairing
the obligation of a contract, can never depend upon the extent of the change which the law
effects in it."). But this rigid reading of the contract clause was merely a reflection of
contemporary contract clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
87, 138-39 (1810) (rigidly analyzing a public contract with no discussion of the state's interest
in impairing the contract).
Interstate compacts should be examined under the same analysis as public contracts. The
public contract analysis of United States Trust Co. was established to meet the problem that a
state, being a party to the contract, was likely to be influenced by its self-interest. 431 U.S. at
26. The same problem inheres with interstate compacts. To address this self-interest problem,
the public contract analysis focuses upon whether the impairment "is reasonable and necessary
to serve an important public purpose." Id. at 25. Here, the alleged purpose of altering the
reciprocity compacts (by enacting the axle tax) was to effect a "rational restructuring of
Pennsylvania's highway user charges." Scheiner, 510 Pa. at 445, 459-60, 509 A.2d at 846, 854;
Brief for Appellees at 19-20. Other than suggesting that Pennsylvania's registration fees were
"higher than the national average," the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania offered no reason why
such a restructuring was necessary. See Scheiner, 510 Pa. at 445-46, 509 A.2d at 846; see also
id. at 469, 509 A.2d at 858 (Nix, C.J. & McDermott, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is nothing in the
statute itself or in the circumstances surrounding the enactment of Act 234 [the axle tax]
which adds legitimacy to appellants' argument that it was designed to restructure the tax
burden upon the trucking industry in this Commonwealth."); cf. Brief for Appellees at 19 (to
require Pennsylvania to make findings before it can reallocate tax burdens under its highway
user scheme would be to "exalt[ ] form over substance"). This barebones justification would
be hardpressed to survive the strict test of necessity.
76. The standing issue involves two questions. First, are interstate carriers actually third-
party beneficiaries to the reciprocity compact? Second, are they intended beneficiaries? See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 302-315 (1981) (contract beneficiaries).
The first question centers on whether interstate carriers have actually received the benefit of a
tax exemption under the compact. It may be argued that the interstate carrier receives no
benefit from the reciprocity agreements of its base state (the state where its vehicle is
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2. REQUIREMENT THAT TAXES BE IMPOSED UPON
SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT ACTIVITY
A state cannot defend a tax that discriminates against interstate
commerce "merely by pointing generally in the direction of some
other tax" paid only by local commerce.77 Otherwise, the commerce
clause's protection of interstate commerce would be illusory. The
Court therefore has established a test to narrow the scope of the com-
plementary tax doctrine: taxes are not complementary unless they are
imposed on "substantially equivalent event[s]. ' 78 Thus, the underly-
ing activities being affected by each tax must bear a formal similarity.
The Court has applied this test in two cases.79 In Maryland v.
Louisiana,80 the Court initially found that Louisiana's first-use tax on
natural gas extracted from the federally-owned outer continental shelf
area and processed in the state discriminated against interstate com-
merce because exemptions and credits protected local consumers from
the tax's impact."1 The Court then rejected Louisiana's argument
that the first-use tax was valid because it compensated for the effect of
the state's severance tax on local production of gas. As later clarified
in Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty,82 "[s]everance and first-use or processing
[are] not 'substantially equivalent event[s]' on which compensating
taxes might be imposed." 3 Similarly, in Armco the Court rejected the
argument that a tax on wholesalers (from which local manufacturers
registered). This is because the carrier's base state will adjust its fees to reflect that amount of
tax which the reciprocating state forwent. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text
(discussing ATA's indirect contribution argument). As shown above, however, the likelihood
of a state actually readjusting its registration fees to reflect this forgone revenue is problematic.
See supra text accompanying notes 64-65. The discussion therefore proceeds on the
assumption that the reciprocity agreements reduce the total amount of taxes to which
interstate carriers are subject. Given this assumption, an interstate carrier is indeed a
beneficiary of its home state's reciprocity agreements. The second question (whether the
carrier is an intended or incidental beneficiary) is significant because it determines whether the
carrier has standing to bring suit and enforce the compact. See RESTATEMENT, supra, §§ 304,
315 (only an intended beneficiary may enforce a duty under the contract); see also E.
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 10.5, at 734-35 (1982) (intended beneficiary has a newly-
acquired right against the promisor). This question is problematic because it requires an
analysis of the circumstances under which Pennsylvania adopted its reciprocity policy. See
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 302.
77. See Brief for Appellants at 21.
78. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 643 (1984) (manufacturing and wholesaling
are not substantially equivalent events); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 759 (1981)
(processing and severance are not substantially equivalent events).
79. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725
(1981).
80. 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
81. Id. at 756-57.
82. Armco, 467 U.S. at 642-43.
83. Id. at 643 (quoting Maryland, 451 U.S. at 759). In Maryland, the Court seemed to
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conducting in-state wholesaling were exempt) compensated for the
much higher manufacturing tax on local manufacturers. The Court
concluded that "manufacturing and wholesaling are not 'substantially
equivalent events' such that the heavy tax on in-state manufacturers
can be said to compensate for the admittedly lighter burden placed on
wholesalers from out of State."
' s4
Pennsylvania's axle tax and registration fee would appear to ful-
fill the substantial equivalence requirement."' At first glance, both
taxes seem to be imposed on precisely the same activity-use of Penn-
sylvania's highways. As noted by ATA, however, there is a differ-
ence: while the registration fee is a tax on the privilege of using the
highways of many states (by virtue of reciprocity arrangements), the
axle impost is a tax merely on the privilege of using Pennsylvania's
highways.8 6 The difference between the two taxes therefore is that
one-the registration fee-is accompanied by reciprocity and conse-
quently covers a greater amount of activity. The question then is
whether this difference is significant enough that the two taxes do not
bear upon substantially equivalent activity.
The presence of reciprocity in the registration fee would not
appear to be a relevant difference because, as initially supposed, both
levies actually tax the same activity: the use of Pennsylvania's high-
ways. Reciprocity merely allows Pennsylvania to tax a locally-based
vehicle more heavily (through a higher registration fee) than it other-
wise could. 7 But the level of Pennsylvania's registration fees does not
seem to affect the question of whether those fees are imposed on the
same activity as is the axle tax. It is certainly not beyond the bounds
of reason to suggest that the activities taxed by the axle tax and regis-
tration fee are substantially similar. In any event, an attempt at
applying the substantial equivalence test is somewhat of a scholastic
advance the slightly different rationale that the state did not have the same conservation
interest in the two taxes:
To be sure, Louisiana has an interest in protecting its natural resources, and...
has chosen to impose a severance tax on the privilege of severing resources from
its soil. But the First-Use Tax is not designed to meet these same ends since
Louisiana has no sovereign interest in being compensated for the severance of
resources from the federally owned [outer continental shelf] land.
451 U.S. at 759 (citations omitted).
84. Armco, 467 U.S. at 643. In concluding that the manufacturing tax was "not in part a
proxy" for the wholesale tax, the Court noted that it was impossible to tell "which portion of
the manufacturing tax is attributable to manufacturing, and which portion to sales." Id.
85. Although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that the axle tax was a valid
"compensatory tax," it did not address the substantial equivalence question. See Scheiner, 510
Pa. at 462, 509 A.2d at 855.
86. Brief for Appellants at 23, Scheiner (No. 86-357).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
1132
1987] AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS v. SCHEINER
exercise given the test's malleable and formalistic nature."8 Such an
attempt illustrates the need for a different ground on which to uphold
or invalidate the axle tax.
In its brief to the Supreme Court, ATA offered an entirely differ-
ent interpretation of the substantial equivalence test.89 Rather than
framing the issue as whether the taxes affect substantially similar
activity, ATA asked whether the taxes purchase the same privilege. 90
Under this formulation of the test, the presence of reciprocity may be
significant because it changes the purchased privilege. ATA argued
that by virtue of reciprocity arrangements, a Pennsylvania registra-
tion fee purchases the right to engage in interstate commerce in many
states, while the axle tax only purchases the right to engage in inter-
state commerce in Pennsylvania. 91 ATA concluded that, because
these taxes "purchase fundamentally different rights," they do not
relate to substantially equivalent events. 92
Even if ATA's formulation of the substantial equivalence test
were accurate, 93 payment of Pennsylvania's registration fee itself does
88. The Court's formulation of this test has not gone uncriticized. As Professor Hartman
noted:
A "bright-line" test is not easily discernible from a number of decisions where
the Court inquired whether the alleged compensating tax did properly serve as a
balm of Gilead to heal an otherwise discriminatorily ill tax....
... The phrase "substantially equivalent events". . . appears to be something
of an accordian [sic] term that can be expanded or contracted as the Court thinks
the situation warrants.
P. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 2:19 (Supp.
1986); see also Judson & Duffy, An Opportunity Missed: Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, A Retreat
from Economic Reality in Analysis of State Taxes, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 723, 741 (1985) (Court
engaging in "semantics-oriented analysis"); Lathrop, Armco-A Narrow and Puzzling Test for
Discriminatory State Taxes Under the Commerce Clause, 63 TAXES 551, 561 (1985) (Court
reverting back to formalism).
89. In support of this argument, ATA in its brief quoted American Trucking Associations
v. Quinn, 437 A.2d 623 (Me. 1981), and cited to Private Truck Council of America, Inc. v.
New Hampshire, 128 N.H. 466, 517 A.2d 1150 (1986); American Trucking Associations v.
Conway, 146 Vt. 574, 508 A.2d 405 (1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3032 (U.S. July
21, 1986) (No. 86-69); and American Trucking Associations v. Conway, 146 Vt. 579, 508 A.2d
408 (1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3153 (U.S. Aug. 22, 1986) (No. 86-276). Brief
for Appellants at 23-24. In none of these decisions, however, did the court state that it was
applying the substantial equivalence test.
90. Brief for Appellants at 23 ("[T]he axle tax and the registration fee do not relate to
'substantially equivalent events' because they do not serve the same function or purchase the
same rights."). ATA in this context seems to use the word "right" interchangeably with the
word "privilege." See id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. ATA's substantial equivalence test is superficially appealing. The manufacturing tax
in Armco v. Hardesty purchased the right to manufacture in the state while the wholesaling tax
only purchased the right to wholesale. Thus, both taxes were not substantially equivalent and
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not purchase any privilege different than does payment of the axle tax.
ATA concedes that it is the registration fee combined with the reci-
procity arrangement that affords the privilege of using many states'
highways. 94 If a reciprocity arrangement is revocable by either party,
then its uncertain lifespan may make reciprocity insufficiently weighty
to merit consideration. Therefore, an analysis operating on the
assumption that reciprocity is a timeless constant may not accurately
reflect reality. If a reciprocity arrangement did not exist, the registra-
tion fee and the axle tax would purchase the same privilege: the privi-
lege of using only Pennsylvania's highways. 95 Yet, the contract clause
may prevent a state from breaching a reciprocity agreement.96 Under
this assumption, an axle tax and a registration fee may indeed
purchase different commodities.
C. Disproportionate Tax Burden on Foreign-Based Trucks
Even if the axle tax were sustained as a nondiscriminatory tax
under the compensating tax doctrine, the commerce clause inquiry is
not yet over. The axle tax must also pass a test of proportionality.
Under this test, the tax must bear a reasonable relationship to the
level of the taxpayer's activities or presence in the state.97 This addi-
tional commerce clause test is necessary to provide interstate com-
merce with a greater degree of protection against burdensome
taxation. The antidiscrimination principle prevents a state from tax-
ing interstate and local commerce unequally. 9 The fairly related
(proportionality) requirement ensures that the level of a tax on inter-
state commerce is not unrelated to the extent of the presence of inter-
state commerce in the state. Because the presence of interstate
commerce in a state will likely be far less than that of local commerce,
the mere fact that local and interstate commerce are being taxed
ATA's test could explain Armco. On the other hand, it could be argued that all general
revenue taxes "purchase" the same thing: "the advantages of a civilized society." See
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 624 (1981). The problem with ATA's
argument is that it does not explain exactly how the taxes must be similar.
94. Brief for Appellants at 23.
95. Moreover, under the logic of ATA's argument, the registration fee and axle tax would
purchase the same privilege (and therefore relate to substantially equivalent events) if a state
included an axle tax in its reciprocity arrangements. This illustrates a problem with ATA's
formulation of the test. Its test ignores the similarity of the activity being taxed and instead
focuses on factors that operate independent of the tax (e.g., the existence of reciprocity
arrangements).
96. For a discussion of the impact of the contract clause on Pennsylvania's reciprocity
policy, see supra note 75.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 107-10, 133-35.
98. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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equally does not mean that interstate commerce is being taxed fairly.
Both tests therefore are necessary.
In applying the fairly related test to the axle tax, the dispute cen-
ters around the manner in which the tax must be fairly related to the
services that the state provides to interstate commerce. Two sets of
decisions by the Supreme Court would offer two different answers.
On the one hand, the Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public
Service Commission99 line of cases" requires the aggregate amount of
the tax to be fairly related to the services provided."10 On the other
hand, Complete Auto Transit v. Brady 1 02 and one of its progeny, Com-
monwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,10 3 require the computational
formula of the tax to be fairly related to the services provided.
1°4
When a flat tax such as the axle fee is involved, 10 5 the distinction
between these two sets of decisions is likely to be decisive:106 The
amount of a flat tax will almost always pass muster. A flat tax, by its
99. 295 U.S. 285 (1935).
100. See Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950) (tax based on vehicle's
market value upheld); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495
(1947) (flat taxes on property carrier for hire upheld); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583
(1939) (flat caravan tax upheld); Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Comm'n, 306 U.S.
72 (1939) (graduated truck tax upheld); Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290 (1937) (flat caravan tax
invalidated because amount excessive in relation to tax's declared purpose); Morf v. Bingaman,
298 U.S. 407 (1936) (flat caravan tax upheld); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public
Serv. Comm'n, 295 U.S. 285 (1935) (flat tax on property carriers for hire upheld); Hicklin v.
Coney, 290 U.S. 169 (1933) (tax based on truck's carrying capacity upheld); Interstate Busses
Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245 (1928) (mileage tax on passenger carrier for hire upheld);
Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554 (1927) (tax on property carriers for hire based on carrying
capacity plus regularity of routes upheld); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916) (tax based
on vehicle's horsepower upheld); Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915) (same); see also
Capitol Greyhound Lines, 339 U.S. at 561 (Frankfurter & Jackson, JJ., dissenting) (chart
analyzing Court's highway user fee cases). But see McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309
U.S. 176, 180 (1940) (gasoline tax on passenger carrier for hire invalidated because formula
bore no reasonable relation to road use); Interstate Transit v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 190
(1931) (tax on passenger carriers for hire based on seating capacity invalidated because
formula bore insufficient relation to use); Sprout v. City of South Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 170
(1928) (same). These cases will be referred to collectively as the "Aero Mayflower line of
cases."
101. See infra text accompanying notes 107-10.
102. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
103. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
104. See infra text accompanying notes 133-35.
105. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania described the axle tax as a "modified flat tax"
because "it is imposed in accordance with actual use for [trucks] traveling less than 2,000 miles
annually in the Commonwealth and at a flat $36.00 per axle fee after 2,000 miles are traveled."
Scheiner, 510 Pa. at 458-59, 509 A.2d at 853; see supra note 19.
106. This likewise applies to the $25 marker identification fee, which ATA is also
challenging. See Brief for Appellants at 28-34. For a discussion of ATA's challenge to the
marker fee, see supra note 11.
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very nature, however, will apparently never "measure" the services
provided to a particular taxpayer.
1. THE Aero Mayflower LINE OF CASES
The axle tax should be upheld under the Aero Mayflower line of
cases. These cases established the proposition that, for a user fee to be
sustained under a commerce clause attack, the total amount of the fee
must fairly relate to the services provided. 107 For instance, in Capitol
Greyhound Lines v. Brice,1°8 the latest in this line of cases, the Court
upheld a tax imposed on common carriers at the rate of two-percent
of the vehicle's market value. The Court ruled that flat user fees "are
valid unless the amount is shown to be in excess of fair compensation
for the privilege of using state roads."1 9 In sweeping terms, the
Court reasoned that "administrative burdens of enforcement ... may
be sufficient to justify states in ignoring even such a key factor as
mileage." 10
More recently, in Evansville- Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dis-
trict v. Delta Airlines,"' a decision not properly considered an Aero
Mayflower flat tax case,1 1 2 the Court in dicta further explained the
fairly related standard for user fees. In Evansville Airport, the Court
rejected an airline's challenge to a charge of one dollar for each pas-
senger boarding commercial airlines at publicly-owned airports." 3
The proceeds of the fee were devoted to airport repair and mainte-
nance. "' 4 The Court explained the fairly related standard as follows:
[W]hile state or local tolls must reflect a "uniform, fair and practi-
cal standard" relating to public expenditures, it is the amount of
the tax, not its formula, that is of central concern. At least so long
as the toll is based on some fair approximation of use or privilege
for use ... and is neither discriminatory against interstate com-
merce nor excessive in comparison with the governmental benefit
conferred, it will pass constitutional muster, even though some
other formula might reflect more exactly the relative use of the
107. E.g., Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495, 503 (1947)
(allowing state to impose "a fair and reasonable nondiscriminatory tax as compensation for the
use of its highways"); Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290, 296 (1937) (requiring taxpayer to show
"that the fee is excessive for the declared purpose"); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia
Public Serv. Comm'n, 295 U.S. 285, 289 (1935) ("fee is moderate in amount").
108. 339 U.S. 542 (1950).
109. Id. at 547.
110. Id. at 546-47 (footnote omitted).
111. 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
112. See infra note 150.
113. Evansville Airport, 405 U.S. at 709-10.
114. Id.
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state facilities by individual users.115
The Pennsylvania axle tax should withstand challenge if ana-
lyzed under the standards set forth by these cases. It is graduated on
the basis of a truck's number of axles. It fairly approximates use
because the greater the number of axles, the heavier the truck, and
consequently, the greater the damage to the road. 116 Certainly, the
axle tax more accurately approximates use than did the tax upheld in
Capitol Greyhound Lines, which was based on a vehicle's fair market
value. 1 17 More importantly, the amount of the axle tax does not seem
excessive. Considering the size of the trucks and combinations
involved, $36 per axle does not appear unreasonable ($180 for a five
axle combination).' 18 In any event, ATA has challenged the formula
and not the amount. That is, rather than attempting to show that the
amount of the tax is unreasonable, ATA has tried to prove that for-
eign-based trucks pay a higher effective tax rate.1 19 Under this line of
attack, ATA has attempted to avoid the difficult burden of showing
the excessiveness of the tax as applied.12°
2. THE CONTINUED VITALITY OF Aero Mayflower
ATA, in its brief to the Supreme Court, argued that the Aero
Mayflower flat tax decisions were effectively overruled by Complete
Auto Transit v. Brady12 1 and one of its progeny, Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana.122 These decisions, ATA contended, hold
115. Id. at 716-17 (emphasis added).
116. See C. TAFF, supra note 2, at 45-46 ("The weight of vehicles affects the condition and
life of the pavement by the amount of stress placed upon it.").
117. Capital Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950).
118. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the expenditures under the bridge
improvement program would exceed one billion dollars over five years. Scheiner, 510 Pa. at
462, 509 A.2d at 855. Because axle tax revenues generated from the axle tax in fiscal year
1983-84 totaled only $68 million from "all interstate motor vehicles," the court found that the
axle tax was not "excessive or unrelated to the services provided by the Commonwealth." Id.
at 462-63, 509 A.2d at 855.
119. See infra note 124 and accompanying text. In its brief to the Supreme Court, ATA
apparently conceded that the amount of the axle tax is not unreasonable. Instead, it argued
that the cumulative burden of flat taxes would be crippling. See Brief for Appellants at 35-37.
120. See Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Comm'n, 306 U.S. 72, 77-78 (1938)
(taxpayer failed to show that tax is unreasonable); Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276
U.S. 245, 251-52 (1928) (taxpayer must "show that the aggregate charge bears no reasonable
relation to the privilege granted"); see also Rosenberg, State Taxation of Interstate Motor
Carriers, 46 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1225 (1960) ("[C]omplaining carrier ... [must] meet[ ] the
difficult burden of proof that the tax exceeds fair compensation .... "). It seems doubtful
that a class representing all out-of-state truckers could successfully challenge a flat tax because
the tax certainly must fairly approximate the use of at least some class members.
121. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
122. 453 U.S. 609 (1981). ATA stated that Aero Mayflower "is out of harmony . .. with
more recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence." Brief for Appellants at 15, 47-48; see also
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that the computational formula, rather than the amount, of the tax
must bear a fair relationship to the taxpayer's presence or activities in
the state. '23 ATA maintained that, under this standard, the axle tax
is not fairly related to "the extent of the presence of interstate trucks
on the highways of Pennsylvania." '24
American Trucking Ass'ns v. Gray, 288 Ark. 488, 497, 707 S.W.2d 759, 762 (1986) (rejecting
ATA's argument that Complete Auto "overruled the Court's decisions in the two Aero
Mayflower cases"), appealfiled, 55 U.S.L.W. 3175 (U.S. Sept. 3, 1986) (No. 86-358); American
Trucking Ass'ns v. Goldstein, 301 Md. 372, 383-84, 483 A.2d 47, 53-54 (1984) (rejecting
ATA's claim that Complete Auto and Commonwealth Edison "effectively overruled the flat fee
cases").
123. Brief for Appellants at 49; see Goldstein, 301 Md. at 384, 483 A.2d at 54.
124. Brief for Appellants at 49. In its brief, ATA framed its disproportionate burden
argument somewhat confusingly. ATA contended that the axle tax is invalid under the
commerce clause because it both discriminates in effect against interstate commerce, and is not
fairly related to the services provided by the state. Id. at 31, 49. These two deficiencies arise
because, as a flat tax, the axle tax operates "to impose an effective tax rate, in terms of cost per
mile, that is many times higher for the typical truck registered outside Pennsylvania than for a
comparable truck registered in the State." Id. at 28. The premise of this argument is, of
course, that a Pennsylvania-registered truck uses Pennsylvania's highways far more than does
a foreign-registered truck. Id. at 33. But see Brief for Appellees at 36-38, Scheiner (No. 86-
357) (arguing that "evidence is far from conclusive" that trucks registered outside
Pennsylvania pay a higher effective tax rate).
ATA's argument truly centers upon its claim that the axle tax violates the commerce
clause because it disproportionately burdens foreign-based trucks due to "their more limited
presence in the state." Brief for Appellants at 31. Nevertheless, ATA cleverly shoehorns in
the discriminatory effect argument under the following reasoning: The burden of the axle tax
is disproportionately imposed on the less frequent users of Pennsylvania's highways. Because
statistics show that foreign-based trucks are these less frequent users, the tax singles them out
for a disproportionate share of the burden (even though some in-state trucks may also get
soaked by the tax). See id. at 32-34.
A discrimination analysis, however, is not appropriate. The axle tax does not treat
taxpayers differently on the basis of their state of origin. Its differential treatment is based on
level of use. It is therefore inaccurate to claim that the tax "discriminates" against interstate
commerce. See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 617-20. For doctrinal clarity, ATA's
argument should be analyzed under the fairly related test. See id. at 620 ("[A]ppellants'
discrimination theory ultimately collapses into their claim that the Montana tax is . . .not
'fairly related to the services provided by the State.' "); see also Gray, 288 Ark. at 498, 707
S.W.2d at 763 (taxpayer's fairly related argument "can be answered under the same
authority" as its discrimination argument); Scheiner, 510 Pa. at 454 n. 14, 509 A.2d at 851 n. 15
(applying a fairly related analysis to ATA's disproportionate burden argument although
recognizing that this argument "raises discrimination concerns under the third prong as well
as the fourth"); Brief for Appellees at 24 (arguing that ATA's "discrimination claim ...
collapses into the [fairly related] claim and must meet the same test").
Despite attempting to mask its disproportionate burden argument as a discrimination-in-
effect one, ATA has revealed that its real quarrel is with the relationship of the axle tax to use
of Pennsylvania's highways. This point is illustrated by comparing ATA's present
discriminatory effect argument with its earlier argument that the axle tax discriminates against
interstate commerce in effect because of the simultaneous reductions in registration fees. See
supra text accompanying notes 41-43. The earlier argument alleged discrimination because a
locally-registered truck was effectively exempted from the axle tax on the sole basis that it was
locally registered. Under the present argument, "discrimination" is a function of the truck's
relative use of the state's highways. ATA, moreover, proposes that, as an alternative to flat-
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In the period before the Court decided Complete Auto, the
Court's commerce clause analysis of state taxes was beset with for-
malistic labels.1 25 The Aero Mayflower cases were decided during this
period.1 26 In this period, the Court based its tax analysis on a direct/
indirect distinction. A state was prohibited from imposing a direct
tax on the "privilege" of engaging in an exclusively interstate activity
or transaction. The Court, however, recognized that a state had a
peculiar interest in exacting compensation from users of its services
and facilities, whether or not the user was a solely interstate con-
cern.127 Accordingly, it carved out an exception to the rule and thus
afforded a basis for the Aero Mayflower decisions: a state could
directly burden interstate commerce with a tax if the levy was for the
privilege of using its highways (rather than for the privilege of engag-
ing in interstate commerce).1 21 Unfortunately, the line drawn
between a privilege tax and a user fee was often imperceptible.
1 29
rate taxes, states impose mileage-based taxes which, as ATA contends, reflect actual use. Brief
for Appellants at 39-40. In choosing such an alternative, ATA reveals that its ultimate dispute
is with the relationship of the axle tax to actual use.
For the discriminatory effect argument, ATA relied heavily upon Nippert v. City of
Richmond, where the Court invalidated a fixed-sum license tax the city of Richmond imposed
upon itinerant merchants. 327 U.S. 416 (1946). ATA quoted the Court as stating "that 'a
single act of ... solicitation would bring the [flat tax] into play' and that the tax 'inherently
bore no relation to the volume of business done or of returns from it.' " Brief for Appellants at
29 (quoting Nippert, 327 U.S. at 427). Nippert, however, did not involve a user fee. Unless the
Court reevaluates its position that user fees are to be "put to one side" and decided under a
different "fairly related" standard than general revenue taxes, Nippert has no bearing on the
instant case. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 621-22 & n. 12 (1981).
125. See supra note 35.
126. Complete Auto was decided in 1977 while the latest of the Aero Mayflower line of cases
was decided in 1950. See cases cited supra note 100.
127. See Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554, 557 (1927) ("The highways are public property....
Users of them, although engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, may be required to
contribute to their cost and upkeep."); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167 (1916) (power of
state to legislate in the area of highway transportation has been "broadly sustained");
Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 624 (1915) ("[W]here a State at its own expense furnishes
special facilities for the use of those engaged in commerce, interstate as well as domestic, it
may exact compensation therefor."); see also P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF
INTERSTATE COMMERCE 122 (1953) ("Few subjects of state regulation are so peculiarly of
local concern as the use of state highways.").
128. See cases cited supra note 127.
129. As the Court stated in Aero Mayflower itself:
Appellant therefore confuses.., a tax affirmatively laid for the privilege of using
the state's highways, with a tax not imposed on that privilege but upon some
other such as the privilege of doing interstate business. Though necessarily
related, in view of the nature of interstate motor traffic, the two privileges are not
identical, and it is useless to confuse them or to confound a tax for the privilege
of using the highways with one the proceeds of which are necessarily devoted to
maintaining them.
Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495, 504-05 (1947) (citation
omitted); see also Brief for Appellants at 42 & n.20 (arguing that the privilege tax rationale of
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The Court finally abandoned the direct/indirect tax burden anal-
ysis in Complete Auto. The Court held that a state could impose a
direct "privilege" tax on interstate commerce if the tax satisfied a
four-prong test.'3 ° ATA, in its brief to the Supreme Court, suggested
that this decision "rendered obsolete" the rationale of the privilege
tax/user fee distinction.' Because a state was now free to impose a
tax that directly burdened interstate commerce, there was no need to
advert to a user fee justification for saving a tax that directly burdened
interstate users of a state's highways. As the evanescent distinction
between "privilege" and "user" taxes has disappeared, the new four-
prong test should apply to all taxes.132
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana 33 elaborated on the
fourth prong-the fairly related requirement-of the Complete Auto
test. Commonwealth Edison involved a challenge to Montana's thirty
percent severance tax on coal mined in the state.I34 In upholding the
tax, the Court rejected the argument that the proper inquiry was
whether the amount of the severance tax fairly related to the services
provided by the state. Remember, this inquiry was the exclusive focus
of Aero Mayflower. Rather, in Commonwealth Edison, the Court
ruled that "when the measure of a tax bears no relationship to the
taxpayers' presence or activities in a State, a court may properly con-
clude under the fourth prong of the Complete Auto test that the State
is imposing an undue burden on interstate commerce."' 35
It may therefore be argued that Complete Auto and Common-
Aero Mayflower no longer has validity). Compare Interstate Transit v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183
(1931) (tax based on carrying capacity invalidated as a tax on privilege of engaging in inter-
state commerce) with Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U.S. 169 (1933) (tax based on carrying capacity
upheld as a tax on privilege of using the state's highways).
130. Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). The test is set out in supra note
33.
131. Brief for Appellants at 31, 47-48 ("Complete Auto ... unquestionably prohibit[s] a
state tax that, by failing to account for out-of-state companies' lesser presence in the state,
operates to impose a greater tax burden on those companies than on in-state firms.") ("Aero
Mayflower... is out of harmony.., with more recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence .... ")
("Especially in the Commerce Clause area, a rule that has been rendered obsolete by
subsequent legal and factual developments has no legitimate claim to continued application.");
see also cases cited supra note 122.
132. Indeed, the Court has referred to this test in virtually every case in which a state's tax
was challenged under the commerce clause. See Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 643
n.6 (1984); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617 (1981); Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 754 (1981); Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207,
227-28 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 443 (1980);
Washington Dep't of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750
(1978).
133. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
134. Id. at 613.
135. Id. at 629 (emphasis added).
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wealth Edison effectively overruled the flat tax cases. Complete Auto
discarded the distinction between direct and indirect taxes on inter-
state commerce and established a test for determining the validity of
taxes that burden interstate commerce. Because the old privilege tax/
user fee distinction is no longer needed as a justification for user fees
(to evade the prohibition on direct burdens), the new test should be
applied to the axle tax. As developed by Commonwealth Edison, the
fourth prong of this test would invalidate the flat-rate axle tax because
the tax is not measured to the activities of interstate commerce trucks
in Pennsylvania. The Aero Mayflower cases, thus, have no more vital-
ity as precedent.
Yet, there is a viable argument that the Aero Mayflower cases
have continuing vitality because the Court has cited to them with
approval on at least three separate occasions.1 36 First, Evansville-
Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines,1 37 a modem
decision, upheld a user fee under an Aero Mayflower analysis.1 38 This
case admittedly is tainted by the fact that it was decided before Com-
plete Auto.139 Also, it involved a charge on the use of airport facilities
rather than highway user fees. Nonetheless, Evansville Airport at least
indicates that the Aero Mayflower cases, although decided some
twenty years earlier, are not timeworn relics with no utility save dis-
play in a constitutional law museum."
Second, in Massachusetts v. United States, 41 which was decided
soon after Complete Auto, the Court relied upon the Aero Mayflower
cases to resolve a question concerning state immunity from federal
taxation. Drawing an analogy to the Aero Mayflower commerce
clause cases,142 the Massachusetts Court upheld a federal flat fee on
users of aircraft in the navigable airspace of the United States as
applied to aircraft owned by the state. The state, however, argued that
flat user fees, while permissible in commerce clause contexts, should
not be permitted in the state immunity context. 143 It asserted that the
136. See Brief for Appellees at 24.
137. 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
138. The Court, for example, stated that "it is the amount of the tax, not its formula, that is
of central concern." Id. at 716. For a discussion of Evansville Airport, see supra text
accompanying notes 111-15.
139. That is, if it is true that Complete Auto somehow overruled the Aero Mayflower cases,
Evansville Airport would offer no support.
140. See Brief for Appellees at 24 (arguing that the Aero Mayflower flat tax analysis "is [not]
from a bygone era"). But see Brief for Appellants at 48 (arguing that the Aero Mayflower rule
"has been rendered obsolete by subsequent legal and factual developments").
141. 435 U.S. 444 (1978).
142. Id. at 463-64 (stating that the argument that a flat tax "is not directly related to the
degree of use ... has been confronted and rejected in analogous contexts").
143. Id. at 464.
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values protected by the doctrine of state immunity "require that any
user tax be closely calibrated to the amount of any taxpayer's actual
use."'" The Court rejected this argument: "[E]ven if the flat fee does
cost [the state] somewhat more than it would have to pay under a
perfect user-fee system, there is still no interference with the values
protected by the implied constitutional tax immunity of the States." 45
As noted by the dissent, however, the "essential sovereign interests"
of the states are entitled to greater deference than are "ordinary busi-
ness enterprises."' 46 Therefore, if flat user fees are valid as against a
state immunity argument, then a fortiori they must be valid as against
an undue burden on interstate commerce argument.
Finally, in analyzing a severance tax under Complete Auto's
fairly related prong, the Court, in Commonwealth Edison, "put [cases
involving user fees] to one side" as irrelevant to its discussion of a
general revenue tax. 147 Unlike user fees, a general revenue tax is valid
only if its measure is fairly related to the taxpayer's activities in the
state. 48 Thus, rather than overruling the flat tax cases, Common-
wealth Edison cited them with approval in their context.
Neither the argument for, nor the argument against, the continu-
ing vitality of the Aero Mayflower cases can offer a definitive answer to
the question. Although the Court has cited the Aero Mayflower cases
in modem opinions, it has neither reaffirmed nor overruled them.
Since 1950, the year in which the last Aero Mayflower case was
decided, 49 the Court has not been confronted with a case where flat-
-rate highway fees have been challenged under the commerce clause. 150
144. Id. at 464-65.
145. Id. at 466.
146. Id. at 473 (Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
147. Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 621-22 & n.12 (citing Evansville-Vanderburgh
Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707 (1972)); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S.
583 (1939); Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290 (1937)); see also Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at
647 & n.13 (Blackmun, Powell & Stevens, JJ., dissenting on other grounds) ("[I]nterstate
commerce can be required to 'pay its own way' in a narrower sense as well: the State may tax
interstate commerce for the purpose of recovering those costs attributable to the activity
itself.").
148. See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 621-22 & n.12, 629.
149. Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950). For a discussion of Capitol
Greyhound Lines, see supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
150. Although the Court adverted to the Aero Mayflower cases in Evansville-Vanderburgh
Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707 (1972), that case did not involve a
flat user fee. The challenged fee was a charge of one dollar for each person boarding a
commercial aircraft. Id. at 709-10. The fee was proportioned to actual use: the more
passengers an airline served, the greater the wear and tear to the state's airport facilities, and
the greater the tax. Because the Court therefore was faced with a tax that clearly related to
actual use, it had no occasion to reconsider whether flat taxes were valid. See Brief for
Appellants at 48 ("[R]ather than being a discriminatory flat tax, the $1 fee in Evansville ...
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The Court in American Trucking Associations v. Scheiner 15 1 therefore
is largely free to determine whether Aero Mayflower is still "good
law."
3. Aero Mayflower RECONSIDERED
The Aero Mayflower rule that the aggregate amount, rather than
the computational formula, of a user fee must fairly relate to the serv-
ices provided is supported by two basic rationales, both of questiona-
ble validity today. First, a carrier who pays the flat tax, and thus
purchases a theoretically unlimited privilege of using the state's high-
ways, cannot complain over its own failure to fully enjoy the privilege.
As stated by Justice Cardozo in Aero Mayflower: "The fee is for the
privilege of a use as extensive as the carrier wills that it shall be....
One who receives a privilege without limit is not wronged by his own
refusal to enjoy it as freely as he may." '52 This position, however,
mercilessly ignores the plight of the carrier who engages solely in
interstate commerce. As forcefully argued by ATA in its brief to the
Supreme Court:
[This] reasoning founders on the fact that an interstate truck can-
not be in more than one state at a time, and its route is governed by
the demands of its shippers. In addition, as an increasing number
of states adopt flat highway taxes, each certainly cannot justify its
levy on the theory that trucks should spend more time in that state
and less in others.1 5 3
was proportional to the governmental services provided and operated to treat all users
equally.").
Although the Court in Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978), seemed to
approve of the Aero Mayflower cases, this decision raised an implied state immunity issue and
not a commerce clause question. Concededly, Massachusetts did involve a flat rate user fee and
relied even more heavily upon the Aero Mayflower cases than did Evansville Airport. Its use of
the flat tax cases, however, was only by way of analogy. See Brief for Appellants at 48.
User fees were not involved in either Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274
(1977), or Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981). In Complete Auto,
the Court upheld a tax on the "privilege" of doing business within the state as applied to an
exclusively interstate concern. 453 U.S. at 289. It thus overruled cases that distinguished
between direct and indirect taxes on interstate commerce. As a case merely rejecting the view
that "interstate commerce is immune from state taxation," id. at 288, Complete Auto provides
scant support for the position that the Aero Mayflower cases have been effectively overruled.
In Commonwealth Edison, the Court held that the Aero Mayflower rule (that the amount of the
tax must fairly relate to the provided services) did not apply to general revenue taxes. 453 U.S.
at 621-22 & n. 12. It did not suggest that this rule was no longer applicable in user fee cases.
151. 510 Pa. 430, 509 A.2d 838, prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 430 (1986).
152. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Serv. Comm'n, 295 U.S. 285, 289
(1935); see Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495, 506 n.19
(1947). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania accepted this argument with respect to the
marker identification fee. Scheiner, 510 Pa. at 457, 509 A.2d at 852.
153. Brief for Appellants at 45; see also Barrett, "Substance" vs. "Form"in the Application
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A tax that disproportionately burdens interstate commerce should be
based on a stronger foundation.
Flat-rate user fees are also justified on the ground that it is infea-
sible or inconvenient to administer a tax that is precisely calibrated to
use by each, vehicle. The Court articulated this concern in Capitol
Greyhound Lines v. Brice,154 the latest of the Aero Mayflower cases, as
follows:
[W]ith full appreciation of congenital infirmities of the Maryland
formula-and indeed of any formula in this field-as well as of our
present rules to test its validity, we are by no means sure that the
remedy suggested by appellants would not bring about greater ills.
Complete fairness would require that a state tax formula vary with
every factor affecting appropriate compensation for road use.
These factors ... are so countless that we must be content with
"rough approximation rather than precision." Each additional
factor adds to administrative burdens of enforcement, which fall
alike on taxpayers and government. We have recognized that such
burdens may be sufficient to justify states in ignoring even such a
key factor as mileage, although the result may be a tax which on its
face appears to bear with unequal weight upon different carriers.' 5
Essentially, the Court, after weighing the costs and benefits of requir-
ing a more equitable tax formula, decided that the balance should fall
on the side of state discretion. The Court's reasoning, however, did
not appear to give the state unbridled discretion in arriving at its tax
formula. Indeed, the Court stated that "upon this type of reasoning
rests our general rule" that user fees are valid unless their amount
exceeds fair compensation. 156 Thus, Capitol Greyhound Lines seems
of the Commerce Clause to State Taxation, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 740, 788 (1953) ("[T]he very
nature of the business indicates that the interstate carrier will not make as full a use of the state
highways as the intrastate carrier."); Kauper, State Taxation of Interstate Motor Carriers, 32
MICH. L. REV. 171, 203, 207 n.234 (1933) (arguing that the "heart of the difficulty" is the
imposition of flat taxes that are "not apportioned according to the use made of the highways");
Lockhart, State Tax Barriers to Interstate Trade, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1253, 1267 (1940)
(arguing that fees not based on mileage "work a particular hardship on carriers not operating
over regular routes").
154. 339 U.S. 542 (1950).
155. Id. at 546-47 (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306
U.S. 583, 599 (1939) ("state is not required to compute with mathematical precision the cost to
it of the services necessitated by the caravan traffic"); Brief for Appellees at 31-32 (asserting
that "it is somewhat premature to argue that usage taxes based on mileage are so easy to
administer that this Court should have no concerns about requiring such taxes"); cf
Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 466 (1978) ("If the National Government were
required more precisely to calibrate the amount of the fee to the extent of the actual use of the
airways, administrative costs would increase and so would the amount of revenue needed to
operate the system.").
156. Capitol Greyhound Lines, 339 U.S. at 547 (emphasis added).
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to allow some leeway for challenging tax formulas. 1" Unfortunately,
the actual holding of the case effectively rules out such a narrow
reading. 15
8
The Court should reject the Capitol Greyhound Lines holding,
but adopt the reasoning suggested (but not followed) in that case.
Flat taxes represent a dual menace to interstate commerce. First,
these taxes disproportionately burden interstate carriers which, by
their very nature, cannot use a state's roads to the same extent as local
carriers.159 Secondly and relatedly, if these taxes receive the Court's
constitutional imprimatur, many more states can be expected to levy
them. The resulting cumulative burden may prove to be highly dis-
ruptive to the interstate carrier business. 16°
157. In their dissent, Justices Frankfurter and Jackson argued that there should be such
leeway:
Systems of taxation need not achieve the ideal. But the fact that the Constitution
does not demand pure reason and is satisfied by practical reason does not justify
unreason. . . Reason precludes the notion that a tax for a privilege may
disregard the absence of a nexus between privilege and tax.
Id. at 552-53 (Frankfurter & Jackson, JJ., dissenting).
158. The Court upheld a fee of two percent upon the "fair market value" of vehicles
engaged in interstate commerce. Id. at 543. The dissent pointed out that this tax "has at best
a most tenuous relationship to the privilege of using the roads, since differences in value are
due to a vehicle's appointments [equipment] or its age or to other factors which have no
bearing on highway use." Id. at 553. The Court nonetheless has attempted to give Capitol
Greyhound Lines a narrow reading. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta
Airlines, 405 U.S. 707 (1972). In Evansville Airport, the Court remarked that the tax involved
in Capitol Greyhound Lines "was supplemental to a standard mileage charge imposed by the
State, so that 'the total charge as among carriers [did] vary substantially with the mileage
traveled.'" Id. at 716 (quoting Capitol Greyhound Lines, 339 U.S. at 546) (emphasis added)
(brackets in original). This, however, ignores the fact that the Court, when passing on the
validity of one tax, has generally refused to consider the impact of other taxes. See Aero
Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495, 502 (1947); Dixie Ohio
Express Co. v. State Revenue Comm'n, 306 U.S. 72, 77-78 (1939); cf Interstate Busses Corp.
v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245, 251 (1928) (Discrimination against interstate commerce is not
present merely because the tax is "different in form or adopt[s] a different measure or method
of assessment [from the one imposed on intrastate commerce], or that it is subject to three
kinds of taxes while intrastate carriers are subject only to two or to one."). In any event, the
Court's observation in Evansville Airport would prove too much, as almost every state imposes
a mileage-related fuel tax. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FED HIGHWAY ADMIN., HIGHWAY
TAXES AND FEES, How THEY ARE COLLECTED AND DISTRIBUTED, 1986, at 7-9 (1986).
159. For a discussion of ATA's disproportionate burden argument, see supra note 124 and
accompanying text.
160. See Capitol Greyhound Lines, 339 U.S. at 557 (Frankfurter & Jackson, JJ., dissenting)
(finding a "danger-and not a fanciful danger-that the interstate carrier will be subject to"
the cumulative burden of multiple taxation); see also Scheiner, 510 Pa. at 472, 509 A.2d at 860
(Nix, C.J. & McDermott, J., dissenting) (arguing that if all states imposed legislation similar to
the axle tax, "the impact upon interstate commerce would indeed be crippling").
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IV. CONCLUSION
An alternative to the Aero Mayflower version of the fairly related
test is needed when examining highway user fees. The Capitol Grey-
hound Lines reasoning provides a good starting point for this alterna-
tive. In addition to the excessiveness-of-amount test heretofore
employed, the Court should adopt a less burdensome alternative
test.16" ' This approach would balance the administrative cost to the
state of enforcing and calculating the tax against the severity of the
tax's burden on interstate commerce: the more burdensome the tax,
the greater the burden upon the state to prove an absence of feasible
alternatives to a flat tax. 162 In this way, a state could impose substan-
tial taxes on out-of-state trucks as long as the taxes reasonably reflect
the extent and manner of use. The interests of the states would be
protected because they could still exact fair compensation from inter-
state commerce. Interstate carriers would be protected from the dan-
ger of cumulative taxation.
Under such an approach, the Court should invalidate the axle
tax. It imposes an annual tax of between $72 and $180 on each truck
or combination using Pennsylvania's highways for over 2000 miles a
year. Because the axle tax goes beyond a mere nominal charge, it
should reasonably reflect the extent and manner of use. 163 The axle
tax reflects the manner of a truck's use of Pennsylvania's highways
because a tax graduation based on axle number closely reflects the
degree of wear and tear to which the state's roads and bridges will be
subjected. However, the axle tax does not reflect the extent of the
carrier's use of Pennsylvania's highway facilities. Once the carrier
exceeds the 2000 mile limit, it pays a substantial tax that does not
account for the total miles driven in Pennsylvania. Although the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in upholding the axle tax found that the
161. The Court may be guided by its commerce clause analysis of state regulations of
interstate commerce where it has employed a less restrictive alternative test. See, e.g., Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); see also Tatarowicz & Mims-Velarde, supra note 46, at 884 n.16
(arguing that a balancing approach may be used in certain situations when analyzing state
taxation under the commerce clause).
162. In its brief to the Supreme Court, ATA stated that flat taxes cannot be "justified by a
state's reflexively asserting, or a court's uncritically accepting, a claim of administrative
convenience." Brief for Appellants at 42 (emphasis added). It thus acknowledged that there
are occasions when a state, for administrative convenience reasons, may legitimately impose a
flat tax.
163. Compare the axle tax with the $5 marker identification fee. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2102(b) (Purdon Supp. 1986). For a discussion of ATA's challenge to the marker fee when it
was $25, see supra note 11.
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aggregate amount of the tax was not excessive, it offered no reason
why a mileage-based tax would not be a feasible alternative.
ROBERT J. BORRELLO*
* This Note is dedicated to my family for their support and love. Special thanks to
Kevin Dorse and Susan Elkin for their invaluable assistance.
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